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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

mining whether the "substantial revenue" requirement was satisfied.
Undoubtedly, however, there is an urgent need for a legislative or an
appellate pronouncement regarding minimum amounts under either
test in order to prevent needless, time-consuming litigation.
CPLR 316: Notice effected by advertisements and handbills in condemnation proceedings deemed adequate in view of the circumstances.
The United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional
requirements regarding notice in Schroeder v. City of New York.' 8
Therein, condemnation proceedings were brought to acquire the right
to divert a portion of a river some twenty-five miles upstream from
plaintiff's summer home. Notice was attempted only by publication
in local newspapers and by posting signs on trees and poles along the
river during the winter. The Court ruled that this mode of service
was constitutionally deficient with respect "to a person whose name and
address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question."' 9
In re Massapequa- Woodbury Road 0 claimants, owners of
a gas station adjacent to a condemned street, contended that they had
not received actual notice of the condemnation proceedings. The court
nonetheless ruled that the required advertisement and the posting of
handbills on or near the property to be acquired satisfied the notice
requirements of the Constitution under the facts of this particular
21
case.
At first glance, it seems incongruous to hold that the plaintiff
in Schroeder,whose property was twenty-five miles from the condemned
area, was entitled to actual notice, while the claimants in the instant
case, owners of property abutting the taking area, do not have the
same right. Nonetheless, the criterion for notice consistent with the
due process clause is that "reasonably calculated, under all the circum22
stances, to apprise interested parties" of the pendency of an action.
If for no reason other than the fact that the proposed acquisition by
the state is likely to be a conversational topic among the local residents,
it seems reasonable to presume that a party who owns property in the
proximate vicinity will be sufficiently informed of his rights by means
of advertisements and handbills.
18 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
19ld. at 212-13.
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